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Abstract 
 
The assumption of the representative household defined as the average of all households is 
impossible in dynamic models if households are heterogeneous in their time preference rates 
because, as is well known, the most patient household eventually prevails. Because time 
preference rates are unquestionably heterogeneous across economies and time periods, 
macroeconomics studies using the representative household assumption in dynamic models are 
fallacious. I present an alternative definition of the representative household based on the 
concept of sustainable heterogeneity. By this definition, use of the representative household 
assumption becomes possible in dynamic models. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of the representative household is a necessity in macroeconomic studies. It is used 
as a matter of course, but its theoretical foundation is fragile. The representative household has 
been used given the assumption that all households are identical or that there exists one specific 
individual household, the actions of which are always average among households (I call such a 
household “the average household” in this paper). The assumption that all households are 
identical seems to be too strict; therefore, it is usually assumed explicitly or implicitly that the 
representative household is the average household. However, the average household can exist 
only under very strict conditions. Antonelli (1886) showed that the existence of an average 
household requires that all households have homothetic and homogeneous utility functions. This 
type of utility function is not usually assumed in macroeconomic studies because it is very 
restrictive and unrealistic. If more general utility functions are assumed, however, the 
assumption of the representative household as the average household is inconsistent with the 
assumptions underlying the utility functions.  
 Nevertheless, the assumption of the representative household has been widely used, 
probably because it has been believed that the representative household can be interpreted as an 
approximation of the average household. Particularly in static models, the representative 
household can be seen to approximate the average household. However, in dynamic models, it 
is hard to accept the representative household as an approximation of the average household 
because, if the time preference rates of households are heterogeneous, there is no steady state 
where all of the optimality conditions of the heterogeneous households are satisfied (Becker, 
1980). Therefore, macroeconomic studies using dynamic models are fallacious if the 
representative household is assumed to approximate the average household.  
 I offer an alternative definition of the representative household that can be used in 
dynamic models. This definition is based on the concept of sustainable heterogeneity shown by 
Harashima (2010, 2012). If sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, all of the optimality 
conditions of the heterogeneous households are satisfied. In addition, if it is achieved, all 
heterogeneous households appear to be behaving collectively as a combined supra-household. 
This supra-household does not fall into the dire state Becker (1980) predicts. Furthermore, the 
supra-household’s behavior is time-consistent. Therefore, the supra-household can be seen as 
representing all heterogeneous households. If the representative household is defined as this 
supra-household, the assumption of the representative household can be introduced even in 
dynamic models. 
 This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the assumption of the representative 
household as the average household is examined. Section 3 shows the nature of sustainable 
heterogeneity. In Section 4, an alternative definition of the representative household that can be 
used in dynamic models is presented. Finally, concluding remarks are offered in Section 5. 
 
2  IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE REPRESENTATIVE 
HOUSEHOLD IN DYNAMIC MODELS 
 
2.1  The representative household in static models 
Static models are usually used to analyze comparative statics. If the average household is 
represented by one specific unique household for any static state, there will be no problem in 
assuming the representative household as an approximation of the average household. Even 
though the average household is not always represented by one specific unique household in 
some states, if the average household is always represented by a household in a set of 
households that are very similar in preferences and other features, then the representative 
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household assumption can be used to approximate the average household.  
 Suppose, for simplicity, that households are heterogeneous such that they are identical 
except for a particular preference. Because of the heterogeneous preference, household 
consumption varies. However, levels of consumption will not be distributed randomly because 
the distribution of consumption will correspond to the distribution of the preference. The 
consumption of a household that has a very different preference from the average will be very 
different from the average household consumption. Conversely, it is likely that the consumption 
of a household that has the average preference will nearly have the average consumption. In 
addition, the order of the degree of consumption will be almost unchanged for any static state 
because the order of the degree of the preference does not change for the given state.   
 If the order of consumption is unchanged for any given static state, it is likely that the 
household with consumption that is closest to the average consumption will also always be a 
household belonging to a group of households that have very similar preferences. Hence, it is 
possible to argue that, approximately, one specific unique household’s consumption is always 
average for any static state. Of course, it is possible to show evidence that is counter to this 
argument, particularly in some special situations, but it is likely that this conjecture is usually 
true in normal situations, and the assumption that the representative household approximates the 
average household is acceptable in static models. 
 
2.2  The representative household in dynamic models 
In dynamic models, however, the story is more complicated. In particular, heterogeneous rates 
of time preference pose a serious problem. This problem is easily understood in a dynamic 
model with exogenous technology (i.e., a Ramsey growth model). Suppose that households are 
heterogeneous in time preference rate, degree of risk aversion (ε), and productivity of the labor 
they provide. Suppose also for simplicity that there are many “economies” in a country, and an 
economy consists of a household and a firm. The household provides labor to the firm in the 
particular economy, and the firm’s level of technology (A) varies depending on the productivity 
of labor that the household in its economy provides. Economies trade with each other: that is, 
the entire economy of a country consists of many individual small economies that trade with 
each other.  
 A household maximizes its expected utility,    dtθtcuE t 

exp
0
, subject to  
  ttt ckfk  , where  u  is the utility function;  f  is the production function; θ is the 
rate of time preference; E is the expectation operator; 
t
t
t
L
Y
y  , 
t
t
t
L
K
k  , and 
t
t
t
L
C
c  ; Yt (≥ 0) 
is output, Kt (≥ 0) is capital input, Lt (≥ 0) is labor input, and Ct (≥ 0) is consumption in period t. 
The optimal consumption path of this Ramsey-type growth model is   
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and at steady state, 
 
θ
k
y
t
t 


 .                               (1) 
 
Therefore, at steady state, the heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion (ε) is irrelevant, and 
the heterogeneity in productivity does not result in permanent trade imbalances among 
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economies because 
t
t
k
y


in all economies is kept equal by market arbitrage. Hence, 
heterogeneity in the degree of risk aversion and productivity does not matter at steady state. 
Therefore, the same logic as that used for static models can be applied. Approximately, one 
specific unique household’s consumption is always average for any time in dynamic models, 
even if the degree of risk aversion and the productivity are heterogeneous. Thus, the assumption 
of the representative household is also acceptable in dynamic models even if the degree of risk 
aversion and the productivity are heterogeneous. 
 However, equation (1) clearly indicates that heterogeneity in the rate of time 
preference is problematic. As Becker (1980) shows, if the rate of time preference is 
heterogeneous, the household that has the lowest rate of time preference will eventually possess 
all capital. With heterogeneous rates of time preference, there is no steady state where all 
households achieve all of their optimality conditions. In addition, the household with 
consumption that is average at present has a very different rate of time preference from the 
household with consumption that is average in the distant future. The consumption of a 
household that has the average time preference rate will initially be almost average, but in the 
future the household with the lowest time preference rate will be the one with consumption that 
is almost average. That is, the consumption path of the household that presently has average 
consumption is notably different from that of the household with average consumption in the 
future. Therefore, any individual household cannot be almost average in any period and thus 
cannot even approximate the average household. As a result, even if the representative 
household is assumed in a dynamic model, its discounted expected utility 
   dtθtcuE t 

exp
0
 is meaningless, and analyses based on it are fallacious.  
  If we assume that the rate of time preference is identical for all households, the above 
problem is solved. However, this solution is still problematic because that assumption is not 
merely expedient for the sake of simplicity; rather, it is a critical requirement to allow for an 
assumed representative household. Therefore, the rationale for identical time preference rates 
should be validated; that is, it should be demonstrated that identical rates of time preference are 
actually and universally observed. The rate of time preference is, however, unquestionably not 
identical among households. Hence, it is difficult to accept the representative household 
assumption in dynamic models based on the assumption of identical time preference. 
 The conclusion that the representative household assumption in dynamic models is 
meaningless and leads to fallacious results is very important, because a huge number of studies 
have used the representative household assumption in dynamic models. To solve this severe 
problem, an alternative interpretation or definition of the representative household is needed. 
 Note that in an endogenous growth model the situation is even more complicated. 
Because a heterogeneous degree of risk aversion also matters, the assumption of the 
representative household is more difficult to accept, so an alternative interpretation or definition 
is even more important when endogenous growth models are used. 
 
3  SUSTAINABLE HETEROGENEITY 
 
3.1  The model 
Suppose that two heterogeneous economies―economy 1 and economy 2—are identical except 
for their time preference rates. Households within each economy are assumed to be identical for 
simplicity. The population growth rate is zero. The economies are fully open to each other, and 
goods, services, and capital are freely transacted between them, but labor is immobilized in each 
economy. 
 Each economy can be interpreted as representing either a country (the international 
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interpretation) or a group of identical households in a country (the national interpretation). 
Because the economies are fully open, they are integrated through trade and form a combined 
economy. The combined economy is the world economy in the international interpretation and 
the national economy in the national interpretation. In the following discussion, a model based 
on the international interpretation is called an international model and that based on the national 
interpretation is called a national model. Usually, the concept of the balance of payments is used 
only for the international transactions. However, because both national and international 
interpretations are possible, this concept and terminology are also used for the national models 
in this paper. 
 The rate of time preference of household in economy 1 is 
1θ  and that in economy 2 is 
θ2, and θ1 < θ2. The production function in economy 1 is  ,t
α
,t kfAy 11   and that in 
economy 2 is  ,t
α
,t kfAy 22  , where yi,t and ki,t are, respectively, output and capital per capita 
in economy i in period t for i = 1, 2; A is technology; and α  10  α  is a constant. The 
population of each economy is 
2
L
; thus, the total for both is L, which is sufficiently large. 
Firms operate in both economies. The current account balance in economy 1 is τt and that in 
economy 2 is –τt. The production functions are specified as  
 
 α
ti,
α
i,t kAy
 1  ; 
 
thus,    2,11,, 
 iALKY
αα
titi
. Because A is given exogenously, this model is an exogenous 
technology model (Ramsey growth model). The examination of sustainable heterogeneity based 
on an endogenous growth model is shown in Appendix.  
 Because both economies are fully open, returns on investments in each economy are 
kept equal through arbitration, such that  
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1

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

 .                             (2) 
 
Because equation (2) always holds through arbitration, equations 
tt kk ,2,1  , tt kk ,2,1
  , 
tt yy ,2,1  , and tt yy ,2,1    also hold.  
 The accumulated current account balance dsτ
t
s0  mirrors capital flows between the 
two economies. The economy with current account surpluses invests them in the other economy. 
Because 
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0
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s
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

0
,2
,2  
represent income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns in the other economy. 
Hence,  
 
dsτ
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0
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,2  
 
is the balance on goods and services of economy 1, and  
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t
t
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t
t
τdsτ
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
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0
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is that of economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between the 
economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies, such that  
 
  ,t,tt ,kkκτ 21  . 
 
 The government (or an international supranational organization) intervenes in the 
activities of economies 1 and 2 by transferring money from economy 1 to economy 2. The 
amount of transfer in period t is gt, and it is assumed that gt depends on capital inputs, such that  
 
,tt kgg 1 ,
 
 
where g  is a constant. Because tt kk ,2,1   and tt kk ,2,1
  , 
 
 
,t,tt kgkgg 21   . 
 
 Each household in economy 1 therefore maximizes its expected utility 
 
    dttθcuE t 1
0
,11 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
  ,tt
t
s
α
,t
α
,t
α
,t
α
t kgτdsτkAαckAk 1
0
11
1
1,1 1  
  ,             (3) 
 
and each household in economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
 
    dttθcuE t 2
0
,22 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
  tt
t
s
α
t
α
,t
α
t
α
t kgτdsτkAαckAk ,2
0
,22
1
,2,2 1  
  ,             (4) 
 
where ui,t and ci,t, respectively, are the utility function and per capita consumption in economy i 
in period t for i = 1, 2; and E is the expectation operator. Equations (3) and (4) implicitly assume 
that each economy does not have foreign assets or debt in period t = 0. 
 
3.2  Sustainable heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity is defined as being sustainable if all of the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are satisfied indefinitely. First, the natures of the model when the 
government does not intervene (i.e., 0g ) are examined. The growth rate of consumption in 
economy 1 is 
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Hence,  
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and thereby  
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, and Ψ is constant at steady state because k1,t and τt are constant; thus, 
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  is constant at steady state. For Ψ to be constant at steady state, it is necessary that 
0lim 

t
t
τ  and thus 0Ξ . Therefore,  
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α
t
 ,                   (5) 
 
and 
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 Because      11 111lim θΨαkAα
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By equations (5) and (7),  
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If equation (8) holds, all of the optimality conditions of both economies are indefinitely satisfied. 
The state indicated by equation (8) is called the “multilateral steady state” or “multilateral state” 
in the following discussion. By procedures similar to those used for the endogenous growth 
model in Appendix, the condition of the multilateral steady state for H economies that are 
identical except for their time preference rates is shown as  
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for any i, where i = 1, 2, … , H.  
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by equation (8), then by 0lim
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Ψ
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 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
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that is, economy 1 possesses accumulated debts owed to economy 2 at steady state, and 
economy 1 has to export goods and services to economy 2 by 
 
  dsτkAα
t
s
α
t
α


0
,11  
 
in every period to pay the debts. Nevertheless, because 0lim 

t
t
τ  and 0Ξ , the debts do 
not explode but stabilize at steady state. Because of the debts, the consumption of economy 1 is 
smaller than that of economy 2 at steady state under the condition of sustainable heterogeneity.  
 Note that many empirical studies conclude that the rate of time preference is 
negatively correlated with income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991; Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 2003). 
Suppose that, in addition to the heterogeneity in time preference rate (θ1 < θ2), the productivity 
of economy 1 is higher than that of economy 2. At steady state, the consumption of economy 1 
would be larger than that of economy 2 as a result of the heterogeneity in productivity. However, 
 8 
as a result of the heterogeneity in the time preference rate, the consumption of economy 1 is 
smaller than that of economy 2 at steady state under sustainable heterogeneity. Which effect 
prevails will depend on differences in the degrees of heterogeneity. For example, if the 
difference in productivity is relatively large whereas that in time preference rate is relatively 
small, the effect of the productivity difference will prevail and the consumption of economy 1 
will be larger than that of economy 2 at steady state under sustainable heterogeneity.  
 
3.3  Sustainable heterogeneity with government intervention 
Sustainable heterogeneity is a very different state from the one Becker (1980) described. The 
difference emerges because, in a multilateral state, economy 1 behaves by fully considering 
economy 2’s conditions. The multilateral state therefore will not be naturally selected by 
economy 1, and the path selection may have to be decided politically (see Harashima, 2010). On 
the other hand, when economy 1 behaves unilaterally, the government may intervene in 
economic activities so as to achieve, for example, social justice. 
 In this section, I show that, even if economy 1 behaves unilaterally, sustainable 
heterogeneity can always be achieved with appropriate government intervention.   
 
3.3.1  The two-economy model 
Government intervention is first considered in the two-economy model constructed in Section 
3.1. If the government intervenes (i.e., 0g ),  
 
 

 




 t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
ds
dt
dsd
c
c
0
0
,1
,1
limlimlim



  . 
 
Because 0g , equations (5) and (6) are changed to   
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If economy 1 behaves unilaterally such that equation (10) is satisfied, then  
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At the same time, if economy 2 behaves unilaterally such that equation (11) is satisfied, then  
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This equation is identical to equation (8) and is satisfied at the multilateral steady state. 
Therefore,  
 
   
,t
t
s
t
.t
,t
t k
dsτθθ
α
θθ
Ψ
k
y
α
θθ
g
1
02112
1
112 lim
2
1
2
lim1
2










  .     (12) 
 
If g  is set equal to equation (12), all optimality conditions of both economies 1 and 2 are 
satisfied even though economy 1 behaves unilaterally.   
 There are various values of Ψ, depending on the initial consumption economy 1 sets. If 
economy 1 behaves in such a way as to make 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
, and particularly, make g = 0 
such that 
 
   0lim
2
1
2 1
02112 






,t
t
s
t k
dsτθθ
α
θθ
g  , 
 
then 
 
 
 
t
t
t k
y
α
θθ
Ψ
.1
,1
21
lim12






                         (13) 
 
by equation (12). Equation (13) is identical to equation (7); that is, the state where equation (13) 
is satisfied is identical to the multilateral state with no government intervention (i.e., g = 0). 
On the other hand, if economy 1 behaves in such a way as to make 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
, 
 
 0
2
12 


θθ
g  . 
 
This condition is identical to that for sustainable heterogeneity with government intervention in 
the endogenous growth model shown by Harashima (2012). Furthermore, if economy 1 behaves 
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in such a way as to make 0lim
0
 dsτ
t
s
t
, g is positive and is given by equation (12). 
 There are various steady states, depending on the values of 
,t
t
s
t k
dsτ
Ψ
1
0
lim


  and the 
initial consumption set by economy 1. Nevertheless, at any steady state that satisfies equation 
(13), all of the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied (by government intervention, all 
optimality conditions of economy 2 are also satisfied). For economy 1, all steady states are 
equally optimal. Economy 1 selects one of the steady states (i.e., sets the initial consumption); 
for example, it may select the one that gives the highest expected utility, the highest steady state 
consumption, or some values based on other criteria. Note, however, that an overly large 
positive Ψ requires zero initial consumption and thus a certain upper bound of Ψ will exist.  
 
3.3.2  The multi-economy model 
In this section, for simplicity, only the case of 0lim
1
0



,t
t
s
t k
dsτ
Ψ  is considered. It is 
assumed that there are H economies that are identical except for their time preference rates. If H 
= 2, when sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, economies 1 and 2 consist of a combined 
economy (economy 1+2) with twice the population and a time preference rate of 
2
21 θθ  . 
Suppose there is a third economy with a time preference of θ3. Because economy 1+2 has twice 
the population of economy 3, if 
 
 
3
2
21
3
θθ
θ
g


  , 
 
then  
 
 0limlimlim
,3
,3
,2
,2
,1
,1


t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
c
c 
 . 
 
By iterating similar procedures, if government transfer between economy H and economy 1+2+ 
∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) is such that  
 
 
H
H
θ
θ
g
H
q
q
H
1
1
1






 , 
 
then 
 
0lim
,
,


ti
ti
t c
c
 
 
for any i (= 1, 2, ∙ ∙ ∙, H).  
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4  AN ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION OF THE 
REPRESENTATIVE HOUSEHOLD 
 
4.1  The definition 
Section 3 indicates that, when sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, all heterogeneous 
households are connected (in the sense that all households behave by considering other 
households’ optimality) and appear to be behaving collectively as a combined supra-household 
that unites all households, as equations (8) and (9) indicate. The supra-household is unique and 
its behavior is time-consistent. Its actions always and consistently represent those of all 
households. Considering these natures of households under sustainable heterogeneity, I present 
the following alternative definition of the representative household: “the behavior of the 
representative household is defined as the collective behavior of all households under 
sustainable heterogeneity.” 
 Even if households are heterogeneous, they can be represented by a representative 
household as defined above. Unlike the representative household defined as the average 
household, the collective representative household reaches a steady state where all households 
satisfy all of their optimality conditions in dynamic models. In addition, this representative 
household has a rate of time preference that is equal to the average rate of time preference as 
shown in equations (8) and (9).
1
 Hence, we can assume not only a representative household but 
also that its rate of time preference is the average rate of all households.  
 
4.2  Universality of sustainable heterogeneity 
An important point, however, is that this alternatively defined representative household can be 
used in dynamic models only if sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, but this condition is not 
necessarily always naturally satisfied. Sustainable heterogeneity is achieved only if households 
with lower rates of time preference behave multilaterally or the government appropriately 
intervenes. Therefore, the representative household assumption is not necessarily naturally 
acceptable in dynamic models unless it is confirmed that sustainable heterogeneity is usually 
achieved in an economy.  
 Notwithstanding this flaw, the representative household assumption has been widely 
used in many macroeconomic studies that use dynamic models. Furthermore, these studies have 
been little criticized for using the inappropriate representative household assumption. In 
addition, in most economies, the dire state that Becker (1980) predicts has not been observed 
even though the time preference rates of households are unquestionably heterogeneous. These 
facts conversely indicate that sustainable heterogeneity―probably with government 
interventions―has been usually and universally achieved across economies and time periods. In 
a sense, these facts are indirect evidence that sustainable heterogeneity usually prevails in 
economies.  
 Note that because the representative household’s behavior in dynamic models is 
represented by the collective behavior of all households under sustainable heterogeneity, the 
time preference rate of the representative household is not intrinsically known to households, 
but they do need to have an expected rate. Each household intrinsically knows its own 
preferences, but it does not intrinsically know the collective preference of all households. 
Therefore, in dynamic models, it must be assumed that all households do not ex ante know the 
time preference rate of the representative household, but households estimate it from 
                                                          
1
 If sustainable heterogeneity is achieved with the help of the government’s intervention, the time 
preference rate of the representative household will not be exactly equal to the average rate of time 
preference. 
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information on the behaviors of other households and the government.  
 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In dynamic models it is hard to accept the representative household as an approximation of the 
average household, because if the time preference rates of households are heterogeneous there is 
no steady state where all of the optimality conditions of the heterogeneous households are 
satisfied. Therefore, macroeconomic studies using dynamic models are fallacious if the average 
household is used as the representative household. I offer an alternative definition of the 
representative household that can be used in dynamic models based on the concept of 
sustainable heterogeneity. If sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, all heterogeneous households 
look like they are behaving collectively as a combined supra-household that unites all 
heterogeneous households. The supra-household’s behavior is time-consistent. Therefore, the 
supra-household can be seen as always and consistently representing all heterogeneous 
households. If the representative household is defined as such a supra-household under the 
condition of sustainable heterogeneity, it can even be used in dynamic models. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Sustainable heterogeneity in an endogenous growth model 
 
A.1  The model 
A.1.1  The base model 
Most endogenous growth models commonly have problems with scale effects or the influence 
of population growth (e.g., Jones, 1995a, b). Hence, this paper uses the model presented by 
Harashima (2013), which is free from both problems (see also Jones, 1995a; Aghion and Howitt, 
1998; Peretto and Smulders, 2002). The production function is tY  ttt LKAF ,, , and the 
accumulation of capital is 
 
tttt AνCYK
   ,                         (A1) 
 
where Yt is outputs, At is technology, Kt is capital inputs, Lt is labor inputs, Ct is consumption, 
 0ν  is a constant, and a unit of Kt and 
ν
1
 of a unit of At are equivalent: that is, they are 
produced using the same quantities of inputs. All firms are identical and have the same size, and 
for any period, 
 
t
t
L
M
m   ,                              (A2) 
 
where Mt is the number of firms, and  0m  is a constant. In addition,  
 
 t
t
tt
t
νA
Y
MK
Y




 
 ;                         (A3) 
 
thus,  
 
t
t
t
t
A
y
mνk
y




 
                             (A4) 
 
is always kept, where yt is output per capita, kt is capital per capita, and  1  is a constant. 
For simplicity, the period of patent is assumed to be indefinite, and no capital depreciation is 
assumed.   indicates the effect of patent protection. With patents, the income is distributed to 
not only capitals and labors but technologies. Equation (A2) indicates that population and 
number of firms are positively correlated. Equations (A3) and (A4) indicate that returns on 
investing in Kt and in At are kept equal and that a firm that produces a new technology cannot 
obtain all the returns on an investment in At. This means that investing in At increases Yt, but the 
investing firm’s return on the investment in At is only a fraction of the increase of Yt, such that 
   t
t
tt
t
t νA
Y
mLνA
Y
M 



 
 because of uncompensated knowledge spillovers to other firms and 
complementarity of technologies. 
 A part of the knowledge generated as a result of an investment made by a firm spills 
over to other firms. Researchers in firms as well as universities and research institutions could 
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not effectively generate innovations if they were isolated from other researchers. They contact 
and stimulate each other. Probably, mutual partial knowledge spillovers among researchers and 
firms give each other reciprocal benefits. Researchers take hints on their researches in exchange 
for spilled knowledge. Therefore, even though the investing firm wishes to keep its knowledge 
secret, some parts of it will spill over. In addition, many uncompensated knowledge spillovers 
occur because many technologies are regarded as so minor that they are not applied for patents 
and left unprotected by patents. Nevertheless, even if a technology that was generated as a 
byproduct is completely useless for the investing firm, it may be a treasure for firms in a 
different industry. At includes all these technologies, and an investment in technology generates 
many technologies that the investing firm cannot protect by patents.  
 Broadly speaking, there are two types of uncompensated knowledge spillovers: 
intra-sectoral knowledge spillovers (i.e., Marshall-Arrow-Romer [MAR] externalities; Marshall, 
1890; Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1986) and inter-sectoral knowledge spillovers (i.e., Jacobs 
externalities; Jacobs, 1969). MAR theory assumes that knowledge spillovers between 
homogenous firms work out most effectively and that spillovers will therefore primarily emerge 
within one sector. As a result, uncompensated knowledge spillovers will be more active if the 
number of firms within a sector is larger. On the other hand, Jacobs (1969) argues that 
knowledge spillovers are most effective among firms that practice different activities and that 
diversification (i.e., a variety of sectors) is important for spillovers. As a result, uncompensated 
knowledge spillovers will be more active if the number of sectors in the economy is larger. 
Nevertheless, if all sectors have the same number of firms, an increase in the number of firms in 
the economy results in more active knowledge spillovers in any case, owing to either MAR 
externalities or Jacobs externalities. 
 Furthermore, as the volume of uncompensated knowledge spillovers increases, the 
investing firm’s returns on the investment in At decrease. 
t
t
A
Y


 indicates the total increase in Yt 
in the economy by an increase in At, which consists of increases in both outputs in the firm that 
invested in the new technologies and outputs in other firms that utilize the newly invented 
technologies, whether the firms obtained the technologies by compensating the originating firm 
or by using uncompensated knowledge spillovers. If the number of firms becomes larger and 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers occur more actively, the compensated fraction in 
t
t
A
Y


 
that the investing firm can obtain becomes smaller, and the investing firm’s returns on the 
investment in At also become smaller. 
 Complementarity of technologies also reduces the fraction of 
t
t
A
Y


 that the investing 
firm can obtain. If a new technology is effective only if it is combined with some particular 
technologies, the return on the investment in technology will belong not only to the investing 
firm but to the firms that hold these particular technologies. For example, an innovation in 
software technology generated by a software company increases the sales and profits of 
computer hardware companies. The economy’s productivity increases because of the innovation 
but the increased incomes are attributed not only to the firm that generated the innovation but 
also to the firms that hold complementary technologies. A part of 
t
t
A
Y


 leaks to these firms. For 
them, the leaked income is a kind of rent revenue unexpectedly become obtainable thanks to the 
innovation. Most new technologies will have complementary technologies. In addition, as the 
number of firms increases, the number of firms that holds complementary technologies will also 
increase, and thereby these leaks will also increase.  
 Because of the uncompensated knowledge spillovers and the complementarity of 
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technologies, therefore, the fraction of 
t
t
A
Y


 that an investing firm can obtain on average will 
be comparatively small, i.e.,   will be far smaller than Mt except that Mt is very small,
2
 and 
the fraction will decrease as Mt increases.  
 The production function is specified as  tt
α
tt ,LKfAY   where α  10  α  is a 
constant. Let 
t
t
t
L
Y
y  , 
t
t
t
L
K
k  , 
t
t
t
L
C
c  , and 
t
t
t
L
L
n

 , and assume that  tt LKf ,  is 
homogenous of degree one. Thus  t
α
tt kfAy   and tt
t
t
ttt kn
L
Aν
cyk 

 . By equation (A4), 
 
 t
t
t
kfmν
kαf
A


  because    t
α
tt
α
t
t
t
t
t kfAkfA
mν
α
k
y
Amν
y





 1 . 
 
A.1.2  Models with heterogeneous households 
Three heterogeneities―heterogeneous time preference, risk aversion, and productivity―are 
examined in endogenous growth models, which are modified versions of the model shown in 
Section A.1.1. First, suppose that there are two economies― economy 1 and economy 2—that 
are identical except for time preference, risk aversion, or productivity. The population growth 
rate is zero (i.e., 0tn ). The economies are fully open to each other, and goods, services, and 
capital are freely transacted between them, but labor is immobilized in each economy. Because 
both national and international interpretations are possible, the concept of the balance of 
payments is also used for the national models in Appendix. 
 
A.1.2.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
First, a model in which the two economies are identical except for time preference is 
constructed. The rate of time preference of the representative household in economy 1 is 
1θ  
and that in economy 2 is θ2, and θ1 < θ2. The production function in economy 1 is 
 tαtt kfAy ,1,1   and that in economy 2 is  tαtt kfAy ,2,2  , where yi,t and ki,t are, respectively, 
output and capital per capita in economy i in period t for i = 1, 2. The population of each 
economy is 
2
tL ; thus, the total for both is Lt, which is sufficiently large. Firms operate in both 
economies, and the number of firms is Mt. The current account balance in economy 1 is τt and 
that in economy 2 is - τt. Because a balanced growth path requires Harrod neutral technological 
progress, the production functions are further specified as  
 
 α
ti,
α
ti,t kAy
 1  ; 
 
thus,    2,11,,   iLAKY
α
tt
α
titi
. 
 Because both economies are fully open, returns on investments in each economy are 
                                                          
2 If Mt is very small, the value of   will be far smaller than that for sufficiently large Mt, because the number of 
firms that can benefit from an innovation is constrained owing to very small Mt. The very small number of firms 
indicates that the economy is not sufficiently sophisticated, and thereby the benefit of an innovation cannot be fully 
realized in the economy. This constraint can be modeled as   tM1~11~     where  1~   is a constant. 
Nevertheless, for sufficiently large Mt (i.e., in sufficiently sophisticated economies), the constraint is removed such 
that      

~~11~lim 1
t
t
M
M
. 
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kept equal through arbitration such that  
 
 
,t
,t
t
,t,t
,t
,t
k
y
A
yy
mνk
y
2
221
1
1
2 






 
 .                   (A5) 
 
Equation (A5) indicates that an increase in At enhances outputs in both economies such that 
 
 t
,t,t
ti,t
i,t
νA
YY
MK
Y




 21 , and because the population is equal (
2
tL ), 





i,t
i,t
i,t
i,t
k
y
K
Y
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 
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 212121
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
. Therefore, 
 
 
    
 
    
 t
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t
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A
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
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 . 
 
Because equation (A5) is always held through arbitration, equations 
tt kk ,2,1  , tt kk ,2,1
  , 
tt yy ,2,1   and tt yy ,2,1    are also held. Hence, 
 
 
 
 
 
 t
t
t
t
t
kfmν
kαf
kfmν
kαf
A
,2
,2
,1
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
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
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 . 
 
In addition, because 
   
t
,t,t
t
,t,t
A
yy
A
yy
,2
21
,1
21




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 through arbitration, then tt AA ,2,1
   is 
held. 
 The accumulated current account balance dsτ
t
s0  mirrors capital flows between the 
two economies. The economy with current account surpluses invests them in the other economy. 
Since 













t
t
t
t
k
y
k
y
,2
,2
,1
,1  are returns on investments, dsτ
k
y t
s
t
t


0
,1
,1  and dsτ
k
y t
s
t
t


0
,2
,2  represent 
income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns in the other economy. Hence,  
 
dsτ
k
y
τ
t
s
t
t
t 


0
,2
,2  
 
is the balance on goods and services of economy 1, and  
 
t
t
s
t
t
τdsτ
k
y



0
,1
,1  
 
is that of economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between the 
economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies such that  
 
  ,t,tt ,kkκτ 21  . 
 
 The government (or an international supranational organization) intervenes in 
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activities of economies 1 and 2 by transferring money from economy 1 to economy 2. The 
amount of transfer in period t is gt and it is assumed that gt depends on capitals such that  
 
,tt kgg 1  
 
where g  is a constant. Because tt kk ,2,1   and tt kk ,2,1
  , 
 
 
,t,tt kgkgg 21   . 
 
 The representative household in economy 1 maximizes its expected utility 
 
    dttθcuE t 1
0
,11 exp 

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subject to 
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and the representative household in economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
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where ui,t, ci,t, and tiA ,
 , respectively, are the utility function, per capita consumption, and the 
increase in At by R&D activities in economy i in period t for i = 1, 2; E is the expectation 
operator; and 
ttt AAA ,2,1
  . Equations (A6) and (A7) implicitly assume that each economy 
does not have foreign assets or debt in period t = 0. 
 Because the production function is Harrod neutral and because 
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and 
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Because Lt is sufficiently large and   is far smaller than Mt, the problem of scale effects 
vanishes and thereby 
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.  
 Putting the above elements together, the optimization problem of economy 1 can be 
rewritten as  
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Similarly, that of economy 2 can be rewritten as 
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A.1.2.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
The basic structure of the model with heterogeneous risk aversion is the same as that of 
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heterogeneous time preference. The two economies are identical except in regard to risk 
aversion. The degree of relative risk aversion of economy 1 is 
'u
"uc
ε
,t
1
11
1   and that of 
economy 2 is 
'u
"uc
ε
,t
2
22
2  , which are constant, and 21 εε  . The optimization problem of 
economy 1 is 
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and that of economy 2 is 
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subject to 
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A.1.2.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
With heterogeneous productivity, the production function is heterogeneous, not the utility 
function. Because technology At is common to both economies, a heterogeneous production 
function requires heterogeneity in elements other than technology. Prescott (1998) argues that 
unknown factors other than technology have made total factor productivity (TFP) heterogeneous 
across countries. Harashima (2009) argues that average workers’ innovative activities are an 
essential element of productivity and make TFP heterogeneous across workers, firms, and 
economies. Since average workers are human and capable of creative intellectual activities, they 
can create innovations even if their innovations are minor. It is rational for firms to exploit all 
the opportunities that these ordinary workers’ innovative activities offer. Furthermore, 
innovations created by ordinary workers are indispensable for efficient production. A production 
function incorporating average workers’ innovations has been shown to have a Cobb-Douglas 
functional form with a labor share of about 70% (Harashima 2009), such that 
 
α
t
α
t
α
tLAt LKAωωσY
 1  ,                       (A8) 
 
where ωA and ωL are positive constant parameters with regard to average workers’ creative 
activities, and σ  is a parameter that represents a worker’s accessibility limit to capital with 
regard to location. The parameters ωA and ωL are independent of At but are dependent on the 
creative activities of average workers. Thereby, unlike with technology At, these parameters can 
be heterogeneous across workers, firms, and economies. 
 In this model of heterogeneous productivity, it is assumed that workers whose 
households belong to different economies have different values of ωA and ωL. In addition, only 
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productivity that is represented by α
tLA Aωωσ  in equation (A8) is heterogeneous between the 
two economies. The production function of economy 1 is  ,t
α
t
α
,t kfAωy 111   and that of 
economy 2 is  ,t
α
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Because equation (A5) is always held through arbitration, equations 
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 Because Lt is sufficiently large and   is far smaller than Mt and thus 
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and similarly, that of economy 2 is 
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A.2  The multilateral path 
In this section, the growth path that makes heterogeneity sustainable is examined. First, the 
basic natures of the models presented in Section 2.1 when the government does not intervene, 
i.e., 0g  are examined.  
 
A.2.1  Sustainability 
Because balanced growth is the focal point for the growth path analysis, the following analyses 
focus on the steady state such that 
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constants. 
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A.2.1.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
The balanced growth path in the heterogeneous time preference model has the following 
properties. 
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Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
Proposition A1-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if 
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Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
 Note that the limit of the growth rate on this path is 
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Corollary A2-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if 
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3 See Harashima (2010) 
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Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
Because current account imbalances eventually grow at the same rate as output, consumption, 
and capital on the multilateral path, the ratios of the current account balance to output, 
consumption, and capital do not explode, but they stabilize as shown in the proof of Proposition 
A1-1; that is, Ξ
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 On the balanced growth path satisfying Proposition A1-1 and Corollaries A1-1 and 
A2-1, heterogeneity in time preference is sustainable by definition because all the optimality 
conditions of the two economies are indefinitely satisfied. The balanced growth path satisfying 
Proposition A1-1 and Corollaries A1-1 and A2-1 is called the “multilateral balanced growth 
path” or (more briefly) the “multilateral path” in the following discussion. The term 
“multilateral” is used even though there are only two economies, because the two-economy 
models shown can easily be extended to the multi-economy models shown in Section A.2.4.  
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A1-1) is examined in the following discussion. 
 
A.2.1.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
On the multilateral path in the heterogeneous risk aversion model, the same Proposition, Lemma, 
and Corollaries are proved by arguments similar to those shown in Section A.2.1.1. 
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Proposition A1-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and only if 
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Corollary A1-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and only if 
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 Note that the limit of the growth rate on this path is  
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Corollary A2-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and only if 
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On the balanced growth path satisfying Proposition A1-2 and Corollaries A1-2 and A2-2, 
heterogeneity in risk aversion is also sustainable by definition because all the optimality 
conditions of the two economies are indefinitely satisfied, and this path is the multilateral path. 
 
A.2.1.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
Similar Proposition, Lemma, and Corollaries also hold in the heterogeneous productivity model. 
However, unlike heterogeneous preferences, 0lim 
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4 See Harashima (2010) 
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Lemma A1-3: In the model of heterogeneous productivity, if 0lim 
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 By Lemma A1-3, if all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied, either  
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Proposition A1-3: If and only if 
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Corollary A2-3: In the model of heterogeneous productivity, if 0lim 
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On the two balanced growth paths satisfying Proposition A1-3 and Corollaries A1-3 and A2-3, 
heterogeneity in productivity is sustainable by definition because all the optimality conditions of 
the two economies are indefinitely satisfied. 
 As shown in Harashima (2010), the limit of the growth rate on these sustainable paths 
is 
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A.2.2  The balance of payments 
A.2.2.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
As shown in the proof of Proposition A1-1, Ξ
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 on the multilateral path. Because ki,t is positive, if the sign of Ξ 
is negative, the current account of economy 1 will eventually show permanent deficits and vice 
versa. 
 
Lemma A2-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, 
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Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
Lemma A2-1 indicates that the value of Ξ is uniquely determined on the multilateral path, and 
the sign of Ξ is also therefore uniquely determined. 
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Proposition A2-1 indicates that the current account deficit of economy 1 and the current account 
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Corollary A3-1 indicates that, on the multilateral path, the trade surpluses of economy 1 
continue indefinitely and vice versa. That is, goods and services are transferred from economy 1 
to economy 2 in each period indefinitely in exchange for the returns on the accumulated current 
account deficits (i.e., debts) of economy 1. 
 Nevertheless, the trade balance of economy 1 is not a surplus from the beginning. 
Before Corollary A3-1 is satisfied, negative dsτ
t
s0  should be accumulated. In the early 
periods, when dsτ
t
s0  is small, the balance on goods and services of economy 1 
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k
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t
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,2 ) continues to be a deficit. After a sufficient negative amount of dsτ
t
s0  is 
accumulated, the trade balances of economy 1 shift to surpluses. 
 Current account deficit of economy 1 means for example that a firm that is owned by 
economy 1 borrows money from a bank in which economy 2 deposits money. Economy 1 
indirectly borrows money from economy 2. This situation can be easily understood if you see 
the current account deficit of the United States.   
 
A.2.2.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
Similarly, the value of Ξ in the heterogeneous risk aversion model is uniquely determined on the 
multilateral path. 
 
Lemma A2-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, 
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Proposition A2-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, 0Ξ  if 
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 As shown in Harashima (2010), the limit of the growth rate on the multilateral path is  
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A.2.2.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
As Lemma A1-3 shows, on the multilateral path, either 0lim 
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 ; thus, Ξ explodes to infinity. Hence, the latter path will generally not be 
selected. The question of which path is selected is examined in detail in the Section 2.3.3. 
 
A.2.3  A model with heterogeneities in multiple elements 
The three heterogeneities are not exclusive. It is particularly likely that heterogeneities in time 
preference and productivity coexist. Many empirical studies conclude that the rate of time 
preference is negatively correlated with income (e.g., Lawrance, 1991; Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 
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2003); this indicates that the economy with the higher productivity has a lower rate of time 
preference and vice versa. In this section, the models are extended to include heterogeneity in 
multiple elements. 
 Suppose that economies 1 and 2 are identical except for time preference, risk aversion, 
and productivity. The Hamiltonian for economy 1 is 
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and that for economy 2 is 
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The growth rates are 
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and the limit of the growth rate on the multilateral path is 
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 as shown in Sections 
A.2.1 and A.2.2. 
 The sign of Ξ on the multilateral path depends on the relative values between θ1 and θ2, 
ε1 and ε2, and ω1 and ω2. Nevertheless, if the rate of time preference and productivity are 
negatively correlated, as argued above (i.e., if 
21 θθ   and 21 ωω   while 21 εε  ), then by 
similar proofs as those presented for Proposition A2-1 and Corollary A3-1, if 
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on the multilateral path; that is, the current account deficits and trade surpluses of economy 1 
continue indefinitely. The condition 
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satisfied for reasonable parameter values.  
 
A.2.4  Multi-economy models 
The two-economy models can be extended to include numerous economies that have differing 
degrees of heterogeneity.  
 
A.2.4.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
Suppose that there are H economies that are identical except for time preference. Let θi be the 
rate of time preference of economy i and tjiτ ,,  be the current account balance of economy i 
with economy j, where i = 1, 2, … , H, j = 1, 2, … , H, and i ≠ j. Because the total population is 
Lt, the population in each economy is 
H
Lt . The representative household of economy i 
maximizes its expected utility  
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for i ≠ j. 
 
Proposition A3-1: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous time preference, if and only if  
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for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at steady 
state, and  
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
A.2.4.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
The heterogeneous risk aversion model can be extended to the multi-economy model by a proof 
similar to that for Proposition A3-1. Suppose that H economies are identical except for risk 
aversion, and their degrees of risk aversion are εi (i = 1, 2, … , H). 
 
Proposition A3-2: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if and only if  
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for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at steady 
state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
A.2.4.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
The heterogeneous productivity model can also be extended by a proof similar to that for 
Proposition A3-1. Suppose that H economies are identical except for productivity, and their 
productivities are ωi (i = 1, 2, … , H). Note that, because 
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Proposition A3-3: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneous productivity, if and only if 
 
 










































θ
αHmv
αω
ε
c
c
α
H
q
q
ti,
ti,
t 1
lim
11

  
 32 
 
for any i, all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are satisfied at steady 
state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
A.2.4.4  Heterogeneity in multiple elements 
Similarly, the multi-economy model can be extended to heterogeneity in multiple elements, as 
follows. 
 
Proposition A3-4: In the multi-economy model of heterogeneity in multiple elements, if and 
only if  
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for any i (= 1, 2, … , H), all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are 
satisfied at steady state, and 
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for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 
 Proposition A3-4 implies that the concept of the representative household in a 
heterogeneous population implicitly assumes that all households are on the multilateral path. 
 
A.3  The unilateral path 
The multilateral path satisfies all the optimality conditions, but that does not mean that the two 
economies naturally select the multilateral path. Ghiglino (2002) predicts that it is likely that, 
under appropriate assumptions, the results of Becker (1980) still hold in endogenous growth 
models. Farmer and Lahiri (2005) show that balanced growth equilibria do not exist in a 
multi-agent economy in general, except in the special case that all agents have the same constant 
rate of time preference. How the economies behave in the environments described in Sections 2 
and 3 when the government does not intervene, i.e., 0g . is examined in this section. 
 
A.3.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
The multilateral path is not the only path on which all the optimality conditions of economy 1 
are satisfied. Even if economy 1 behaves unilaterally, it can achieve optimality, but economy 2 
cannot. 
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Lemma A3-1: In the heterogeneous time preference model, if each economy sets 
tτ  without 
regarding the other economy’s optimality conditions, then it is not possible to satisfy all the 
optimality conditions of both economies. 
Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
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at steady state, all the optimality conditions of economy 1 can be satisfied only if either 
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economy 2 must initially set consumption such that 02,c , which violates the optimality 
condition of economy 2. Therefore, unlike with the multilateral path, all the optimality 
conditions of economy 2 cannot be satisfied on the path satisfying equation (A19) even though 
those of economy 1 can. Hence, economy 2 has only one path on which all its optimality 
conditions can be satisfied—the multilateral path. The path satisfying equation (A19) is called 
the “unilateral balanced growth path” or the “unilateral path” in the following discussion. 
Clearly, heterogeneity in time preference is not sustainable on the unilateral path. 
 How should economy 2 respond to the unilateral behavior of economy 1? Possibly, 
both economies negotiate for the trade between them, and some agreements may be reached. If 
no agreement is reached, however, and economy 1 never regards economy 2’s optimality 
conditions, economy 2 generally will fall into the following unfavorable situation. 
 
Remark 1-1: In the model of heterogeneous time preference, if economy 1 does not regard the 
optimality conditions of economy 2, the ratio of economy 2’s debts (owed to economy 1) to its 
consumption explodes to infinity while all the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied. 
 
The reasoning behind Remark 1-1 is as follows. When economy 1 selects the unilateral path and 
sets c1,0 so as to achieve this path, there are two options for economy 2. The first option is for 
economy 2 to also pursue its own optimality without regarding economy 1: that is, to select its 
own unilateral path. The second option is to adapt to the behavior of economy 1 as a follower. If 
economy 2 takes the first option, it sets c2,0 without regarding c1,0. As the proof of Lemma A3-1 
indicates, unilaterally optimal growth rates are different between the two economies and 
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capital soon becomes abundant in economy 2, and excess goods and services are produced in 
that economy. These excess products are exported to and utilized in economy 1. This process 
escalates as time passes because 
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almost all consumer goods and services produced in economy 2 are consumed by households in 
economy 1. These consequences will be unfavorable for economy 2. 
 If economy 2 takes the second option, it should set c2,0 = ∞ to satisfy all its optimality 
conditions, as the proof of Lemma A3-1 indicates. Setting c2,0 = ∞ is impossible, but economy 2 
as the follower will initially set c2,t as large as possible. This action gives economy 2 a higher 
expected utility than that of the first option, because consumption in economy 2 in the second 
case is always higher. As a result, economy 2 imports as many goods and services as possible 
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accumulated debts of economy 2 will continue to increase indefinitely. Furthermore, they will 
increase more rapidly than the growth rate of outputs (
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expansion of debts may be sustained forever, but economy 2 becomes extremely vulnerable to 
even a very tiny negative disturbance. If such a disturbance occurs, economy 2 will lose all its 
capital and will no longer be able to repay its debts. This result corresponds to the state shown 
by Becker (1980), and it will also be unfavorable for economy 2. Because 
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, inequality (27) holds, and the transversality condition for 
economy 1 is satisfied. Thus, all the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied if 
economy 2 takes the second option. 
 As a result, all the optimality conditions of economy 2 cannot be satisfied in any case 
if economy 1 takes the unilateral path. Both options to counter the unilateral behavior of 
economy 1 are unfavorable for economy 2. However, the expected utility of economy 2 is 
higher if it takes the second option rather than the first, and economy 2 will choose the second 
option. Hence, if economy 1 does not regard economy 2’s optimality conditions, the debts owed 
by economy 2 to economy 1 increase indefinitely at a higher rate than consumption. 
 
A.3.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
The same consequences are observed in this model. 
 
Lemma A3-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if each economy sets τt without 
regard for the other economy’s optimality conditions, then all the optimality conditions of both 
economies cannot be satisfied. 
 
Therefore, heterogeneity in risk aversion is not sustainable on the unilateral path. 
 
Remark 1-2: In the model of heterogeneous risk aversion, if economy 1 does not regard 
economy 2’s optimality conditions, the ratio of economy 2’s debts (owed to economy 1) to its 
consumption explodes to infinity while all the optimality conditions of economy 1 are satisfied. 
 
A.3.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
Unlike the heterogeneous preferences shown in Sections A.3.1 and A.3.2, heterogeneity in 
productivity can be sustainable even on the unilateral path. 
 
Lemma A3-3: In the heterogeneous productivity model, even if each economy sets τt without 
regard for the other economy’s optimality conditions, it is possible that all the optimality 
conditions of both economies are satisfied if 
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Proof: See Harashima (2010) 
 
 All the optimality conditions of economy 1 can be satisfied only if either equation 
(A12) or (A13) holds, because 
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holds. Equation (A12) corresponds to the multilateral path, and equation (A13) corresponds to 
the unilateral path. Unlike the heterogeneity in preferences, Lemma A3-3 shows that, even on 
the unilateral path, all the optimality conditions of both economies are satisfied because the 
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is sustainable even on the unilateral path. 
 Nevertheless, on the unilateral path, current account imbalances generally grow 
steadily at a higher rate than consumption; this is not the case on the multilateral path. How does 
economy 1 set τ? If economy 1 imports as many goods and services as possible before reaching 
the steady state at which 
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), the expected utility of economy 1 will be 
higher than it is in either case where τt > 0 or in the multilateral path. However, the debts 
economy 1 owes to economy 2 will grow indefinitely at a higher rate than consumption, and the 
ratio of debt to consumption explodes to infinity. If there is no disturbance, this situation will be 
sustained forever, but economy 1 will become extremely vulnerable to even a very tiny negative 
disturbance. Hence, the unilateral path will not necessarily be favorable for economy 1 although 
all its optimality conditions are satisfied on this path, and economy 1 will prefer the multilateral 
path. 
 
Remark 1-3: In the heterogeneous productivity model, even though economy 1 does not regard 
economy 2’s optimality conditions, the multilateral balanced growth path will be selected. 
 
Hence, the state shown by Becker (1980) will not be observed in the case of heterogeneous 
productivity.  
 
A.3.4  Doom of the less advantaged economies 
Remarks 1-1 and 1-2 indicate that economy 2’s ratio of debt to consumption continues to 
increase indefinitely on the unilateral path. Such an indefinitely increasing ratio may not matter 
if there is no shock or disturbance. However, if even a very tribunal negative shock occurs, 
economy 2 will be ruined because the huge amount of accumulated debts cannot be refinanced. 
In this case, “ruin” means that economy 2 will go bankrupt or be exterminated because its 
consumption has to be zero unless the authority intervenes to some extent (e.g., debt relief after 
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personal bankruptcy). Even if economy 2 continues to exist by the mercy of economy 1, it will 
fall into a slave-like state indefinitely without the authority’s intervention.  
 
A.4  Sustainable heterogeneity with government intervention 
Sustainable heterogeneity, as described in this paper, is a very different state from what Becker 
(1980) described. The difference emerges because, on a multilateral path, economy 1 behaves 
fully considering economy 2’s situation. The multilateral path therefore will not be naturally 
selected by economy 1, and the path selection may have to be decided politically (Harashima, 
2010). On the other hand, when economy 1 behaves unilaterally, the government may intervene 
in economic activities so as to achieve, for example, social justice.  
 In this section, I show that even if economy 1 behaves unilaterally, sustainable 
heterogeneity can always be achieved with appropriate government intervention.   
 
A.4.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
Government intervention was first considered in the two-economy model constructed in Section 
2. If the government intervenes (i.e., 0g ),  
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on the path satisfying equation (A19). At the same time, 
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Therefore, if  
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Equation (A20) is identical to equation (A10). The government’s appropriate redistribution from 
economy 1 to economy 2 by g  leads to the same consequence with a multilateral path. 
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 Note that if 
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optimality. In this sense, the only appropriate amount of government intervention is 
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A.4.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
Similarly, all of the optimality conditions of economy 1 can be satisfied only if either equation 
(A18) or (A19) is satisfied, and if  
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Equation (A21) is identical to equation (A11). Similar to the case with a heterogeneous time 
preference, the government’s appropriate redistribution by  
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leads to the same consequence with a multilateral path. 
 
A.4.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
Heterogeneity in productivity can be sustainable even on the unilateral path. Hence, government 
intervention is not necessary; that is, even if 0g , the unilateral path is sustainable. 
 
A.4.4  A model with heterogeneities in multiple elements 
By similar procedures as those used in Sections A.4.1 and A.4.2, if  
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and equation (A22) is identical to equation (A14). 
 
A.4.5  Multi-economy models 
A.4.5.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
If H = 2, when sustainable heterogeneity is achieved, economies 1 and 2 consist of a combined 
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economy (economy 1+2) with twice the population and a rate of time preference of 
2
21 θθ  . 
Suppose there is a third economy with a time preference of θ3. Because economy 1+2 has twice 
the population of economy 3, if 
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By iterating similar procedures, if the government’s transfers between economy H and economy 
1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) is such that  
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for any i (= 1, 2, ∙ ∙ ∙, H). Equation (A23) is the same as equation (A15).  
 
A.4.5.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
By a similar procedure as that used for heterogeneous time preference, if the sum of the 
government transfers between economy H and economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) is such that  
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for any i (= 1, 2, ∙ ∙ ∙, H). Equation (A24) is the same as equation (A16).  
A.4.5.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
As discussed in Section A.4.3, even if government transfers between economy H and economy 
1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) is nil (i.e., 0g ), the unilateral path is sustainable. 
 
A.4.5.4  Heterogeneity in multiple elements 
By combining the procedures and results presented in Section A.4.4, A.4.5.1 and A.4.5.2, it can 
be shown that, if the sum of government transfers between economy H and economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + 
(H – 1) is such that  
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for any i (= 1, 2, ∙ ∙ ∙, H). Equation (A26) is the same as equation (A17).  
 
A.4.6  Models of partially unilateral behaviors 
Here, suppose that economy 1 undertakes partly unilateral and partly multilateral behaviors such 
that ψ of k1,0 is allocated to the unilateral path and (1 − ψ) of k1,0 is allocated to the multilateral 
path, where 0 < ψ < 1. In this case, if an appropriate value of g  is set, both the unilateral and 
multilateral parts of k1,t achieve sustainable heterogeneity because the unilateral part of k1,t is 
forced on a path of sustainable heterogeneity by appropriate government intervention, whereas 
the multilateral part of k1,t naturally takes a path of sustainable heterogeneity. Therefore, even 
though economy 1 behaves partly unilaterally and partly multilaterally, if an appropriate value 
of g  is set, the combined path can be sustainable. I call this a “sustainable partly unilateral 
path.” 
 Corresponding to different values of ψ, sustainable partly unilateral paths are different 
and will fall somewhere between the multilateral path and the fully unilateral path with 
appropriate government transfers described by equation (A26). In addition, sustainable partly 
unilateral paths will move continuously as the value of ψ continuously moves. 
 Note that this paper assumes that government intervention can be represented only by 
g , but many other types of interventions are actually possible. For example, debt relief after 
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personal bankruptcy would work as a measure to achieve sustainable heterogeneity, but the 
paths of the less advantaged economies may not be continuous in that case. 
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